+++
date = "2021-10-31T00:25:01+00:00"
publishdate = "2023-12-29T07:08:55+00:00"
title = "The Myth of the Rational Voter"
slug = "the-myth-of-the-rational-voter"
author = "Thedro"
tags = ["abstract","economics"]
type = "abstracts"
summary =  ""
draft =  ""
syntax =  ""
toc =  ""
updated =  "2021-11-01"
+++

_The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies_ is a book
{{< sidenote mark="written" set="left" >}} The read time is about four and a
half hours. {{< /sidenote >}} by the
[American](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States) economist
[Bryan Caplan.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bryan_Caplan) Caplan revisits the
idea of [rational actors,](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rational_choice_theory)
one of the foundational aspects of democracy and economics. Caplan proposes that
voters within the sphere of their _own_ interests vote against them readily and
whole heartedly.

Caplan's main idea is that within the political landscape, voters are "_worse
than ignorant_" --- they are ultimately "irrational" and ensure that this
irrationality is realized in public policies. Voters instinctively select for
politicians who believe or even _feign_ their irrationalities. These
irrationalites are not general but selective --- voters tune in and out
{{< sidenote mark="problematic" set="right" >}} This is sometimes called
[confirmation bias.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Confirmation_bias)
{{< /sidenote >}} information willingly. Caplan paints a realistic picture of
democracy using a framework he calls
[rational irrationality.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rational_irrationality)

## Rational Ignorance

Policies are too complicated and few have the time and knowledge to deconstruct
the particulars that make up an informed decision. A majority of voters
{{< sidenote mark="wisely" set="left" >}}
[The wisdom of the crowd.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wisdom_of_the_crowd)
{{< /sidenote >}} arrive at the position of "_rational ignorance_". These
uniformed voters have minor impact on overall outcomes, provided that all other
things are equal. The well--informed voters make decisions on behalf of the
uninformed voters.

Caplan terms this the "_miracle of aggregation_" which is an extension of
[the law of large numbers.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_of_large_numbers)
A majority of uninformed voters annihilate each other and the unpredictability
of their rational ignorance creates
[random errors](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Random_error) that remove them
from the overall outcome. The well informed ultimately call the shots and make
the better decisions. Soft complexities like this allow politicians to play the
part of an alchemist with a philosopher's stone. The underlying complexities of
democracy provide absurd levels of tolerance to failure and appear to work like
magic.

> It reads like an alchemist's recipe: Mix 99 parts folly with 1 part wisdom to
> get a compound as good as unadulterated wisdom. An almost completely ignorant
> electorate makes the same decision as a fully informed electorate---lead into
> gold, indeed!
{{< footer >}}The Myth of the Rational Voter, Page 8{{< /footer >}}

Beyond underlying complexities like rational ignorance, policy making eventually
arrives at the land of _stranger than fiction_ because as Caplan writes,
"_voters' beliefs of economics are systematically mistaken_".

## Systematic Bias

Perhaps no one ultimately wants to be rationally ignorant. If rational ignorance
introduces random errors, then beliefs introduce systematic errors. Systematic
errors are the biases that affect the entire decision making process in a
distinct and non--random way. Caplan {{< sidenote mark="buckets" set="left" >}}
The Myth of the Rational Voter, Page 30-43 {{< /sidenote >}} these biases into
four categories.

1. **Anti--Market Bias**: Underestimating the benefits of market mechanisms.
2. **Anti--Foreign Bias**: Underestimating the economic benefits of interaction
   with foreigners.
3. **Make--Work Bias**: Underestimating the economic benefits from conserving
   labor.
4. **Pessimistic Bias**: Overestimating the severity of economic problems.

## Preferences Over Beliefs

The psychological tension of preferences over different beliefs ultimately
confine democracies to a limited window of agreeable rationality. Policy makers
may all agree on the destination but not on the journey.

> Put bluntly, rule by demagogues is not an aberration. It is the natural
> condition of democracy.
{{< footer >}}The Myth of the Rational Voter, Page 19{{< /footer >}}

{{< sidenote mark="Demagoguery" set="left" >}} The ability to persuade the
masses. {{< /sidenote >}} is ultimately the name of the game when preferences
over beliefs are at play. The synergistic relationships of preferences, beliefs,
and actionable policies, nudge policy makers to feign the irrationalities of the
electorate, and the electorate to feign the irrationalites of policy makers. The
real influencers play the arbitrary space in between.

> Politicians rarely stick their necks out for unpopular policies because an
> interest group begs them or pays them to do so. Their careers are on the line;
> it is not worth the risk. Instead, interest groups push along the margins of
> public indifference.
{{< footer >}}The Myth of the Rational Voter, Page 20{{< /footer >}}

The preferences for and usability of beliefs are tried on, and discarded like a
change of clothes. As long as a preference does not incur a major cost, then it
becomes unobjectionable. Preferences can be held over beliefs, allowing policy
makers to hold seemingly contradictory positions. Policy makers and electorates
can _afford_ to be irrational and bad policies spread precisely because of this
luxury.

## Rational Irrationality

In Caplan's framework, irrationality becomes a
{{< sidenote mark="heuristic" set="right" >}} A sub-optimal shortcut.
{{< /sidenote >}} for rationality. It's generally accepted that most people
prefer not to be a pariah or contrarian. Just as the comedian pushes the
boundaries of societal norms --- irrationality becomes the currency that "buys"
into rationality. Bad policies for all intents and purposes _must_ be chosen.

> A supporter once called out, "Governor Stevenson, all thinking people are for
> you!" And Adlai Stevenson answered, "That's not enough. I need a majority."
> --- Scott Simon, "Music Cues: Adlai Stevenson"
{{< footer >}}The Myth of the Rational Voter, Page 1{{< /footer >}}

Desire for cold hard facts, truth seeking, and logic are not easily shared
values --- {{< sidenote mark="feelings," set="left" >}} Depending on who you
ask; feelings are facts. {{< /sidenote >}} beliefs, and preferences over beliefs
are their substitutes. Caplan places an economic price on irrationality --- if
the price of irrationality is low, then the demand for irrationality is high.
Caplan also accepts that it is psychologically plausible to _rationalize_
irrationality and describes a hypothetical democratic policy and decision making
process.

> Step 1: Be rational on topics where you have no emotional attachment to a
> particular answer.

> Step 2: On topics where you have an emotional attachment to a particular
> answer, keep a "lookout" for questions where false beliefs imply a substantial
> material cost for you.

> Step 3: If you pay no substantial material costs of error, go with the flow;
> believe whatever makes you feel best.

> Step 4: If there are substantial material costs of error, raise your level of
> intellectual self--discipline in order to become more objective.

> Step 5: Balance the emotional trauma of heightened objectivity --- the
> progressive shattering of your comforting illusions against the material costs
> of error.
{{< footer >}}The Myth of the Rational Voter, Page 126{{< /footer >}}

## Conclusion

The Myth of the Rational Voter gives a compelling answer to the question of
"_why democracies choose bad policies_" for those seeking an answer. In a
broader view, conceptualizing the rational use of irrationality is jarringly
counter--intuitive.

In an economic sense, demarcations like the rational and irrational, or even
luck and hard work could be the result of concealed scarcities. If social
cohesion and emotional comfort are scarce resources, then Caplan's idea of
rational irrationality makes a lot of sense.